Iran Ships Some LPG, Jet Fuel Despite US Blockade, Data Shows

The Leak

Iran has managed to export some liquefied petroleum gas and jet fuel since July, despite a US naval blockade. Tehran conceals these cargoes among ship-to-ship transfers by other Gulf producers off Oman.

UANI analysis shows at least eight gas tankers carrying Iranian LPG have left the Gulf of Oman since mid-July. The total is estimated at 4.1 million barrels.

A jet-fuel tanker reached Myanmar in September. Six of the eight gas tankers and the jet-fuel carrier are under US sanctions.

Most cargoes sailed to Malaysia's Eastern Outer Port Limits for further transfers, likely bound for China. US Central Command calls the blockade "ironclad."

The Treasury says such shipping data should be taken "with a grain of salt." Centcom says 135 ships were turned around and four disabled.

Iranian crude exports fell to zero in September — the first month without a shipment since 2013. Treasury Secretary Bessent says the blockade prevented most Chinese purchases.

Enforcement Credibility

The big story is enforcement credibility. A blockade described as ironclad is leaking petroleum products.

Iran uses Oman's coast and Malaysia's outer port limits — neither an adversary — as laundering layers. Myanmar as a destination ties Iran's evasion to a sanctioned military government Washington has targeted over civilian airstrikes.

This shows how sanctions coalitions strain at the edges where third countries have little incentive to enforce. Iran's crude exports fell to zero in September.

That is the headline. The continuing product flows are the reality.

Centcom's own tally of 135 ships turned around and four disabled shows the blockade is a filter, not a wall.

Rerouted, Not Stopped

Blockades do not eliminate trade. They reroute and reprice it.

Concealment through ship-to-ship transfers raises freight and insurance costs. This widens the discount on Iranian barrels and the premium compliant tankers command.

Zero crude exports alongside nonzero product exports means the sanctions bite hardest on the highest-value channel. Smaller, harder-to-track cargoes slip through.

UANI describes the shipments as "opportunism" rather than a deliberate new strategy. Malaysia and Oman function as de facto clearing houses for sanctioned energy.

The shadow fleet becomes an established piece of market infrastructure. The mechanics matter for policy: every barrel that moves through a laundering layer no longer has to evade detection at the point of loading.

Discount And Conceal

Iran's survival strategy is discount-and-conceal: keep a sanctioned barrel circulating at a haircut. This sustains the shadow-fleet premium compliant shipping pays.

It leaves a persistent, opaque supply overhang in product markets. That is a structural dampener on any policy that tries to tighten supply by blockade.

Jet fuel makes particular sense for Tehran now: US sanctions have grounded much of its aviation fleet, creating a surplus at its refineries. For refiners and traders, that opacity is a feature, not a bug.

It sustains the arbitrage between sanctioned and compliant barrels. Treasury Secretary Bessent says the blockade stopped most Chinese purchases.

The flows suggest rerouting rather than cessation. A market that prices enforcement as partial adjusts its expectations accordingly.